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Abstract: While long waves have been seriously discussed by economists for almost one 
hundred years, to date there is no scientific consensus that particular frequency components 
are in any way privileged in the undoubtedly fluctuating history of modern economic and 
political development. This is disappointing for two reasons. First, the demonstration that 
robust, well-defined periodic components existed would present us with a plausible tool for 
forecasting. And second, they could (and their purported existence has variously been 
thought to) provide insight into underlying causal mechanisms that generate the observed 
patterns. The data, I argue, only provide support for a continuous spectral pattern of a power 
law, 1/fα type. This is borne out in the paper by the analysis of political indicators such as 
the newly revised Modelski/Thompson sea power index and the Levy great powers conflict 
data. Claims for underlying low-dimensional chaos are only partly substantiated. Individual 
peaks at various frequencies in the spectrum are probably only due to “random noise” 
factors unique to segments of the record and not robust across countries and historical 
episodes. While one could then play the game of finding ad hoc explanations for why the 
‘K-wave’ did not take its expected form in this or that century, from the perspective of the 
theory of complex dynamics it seems more plausible to conclude that a periodic model is not 
appropriate. Rather, the underlying model is more likely to be of the self-organized 
criticality or percolation type, characterized by power-law or fractal behavior rather than 
well-defined periodicity. I highlight some features common to several models of innovation/ 
economic dynamics and war/hegemonic cycles, such as highly clustered but nonperiodic 
critical events and resulting long life cycles of rise and decline, that may serve as a plausible 
explanatory mechanism for this ‘revisionist’ interpretation of the empirical record on long 
waves. 
  
Keywords: long waves, war, hegemony, political cycles, complex systems, nonlinear 
dynamics 
 
1 Long Waves as an Exercise in Pattern Recognition 
 
Human beings seem to abhor a conceptual vacuum. They seem to be programmed by 
evolution to detect order in seeming chaos and recognize important configurations like 
previously encountered faces with uncanny accuracy. For indeed, the ability to exploit 
genuine order in the environment (the regularity of the seasons, the habits of prey) should 
impart a selective advantage to those who can properly conceptualize it. Perhaps this is the 
ultimate origin of the scientific enterprise. Yet this selfsame urge probably underlies such 
common behavioral anomalies as gamblers’ delusions, superstition (religion?), technical 
trading and the like. Thus it behooves the scientific researcher to tread carefully in ill-
defined domains, and this for two reasons. First, so as not to fall victim to imagined 
patterns in the data, by carefully formulating null hypotheses of agnostic disorder against 
which a sound methodology is brought to bear, especially if the subject appeals to personal 
or community investments of faith and prospects of metaphysical redemption. And second, 
so as not to reject too neat patterns out of hand, or overlook yet other possibilities by 
becoming excessively fixated on ones that have historically dominated the literature. 
 There seem to be three primordial patterns that have dominated human thought for 
most of history. The first is stasis or apotheosis, a final state in which the universe and 
history will come to rest, preceded possibly by a period of monotonic convergence (the 
Final Judgment, Fukuyama’s end of history, the Solow growth model). The second is 
cyclical (the seasons, the orbits of the planets, acoustical harmonies, the tides), consisting 
of simple or more complex combinations of periodic components, often in ratios of small 
integers. And third is what I would term the Heracleitan pattern, or lack of pattern: a 
universe that is never the same, that displays no law-like regularities and is intrinsically 
unpredictable. This corresponds perhaps to the vision of the German Historical School, 
Angus Maddison’s phases of capitalist development, the efficient markets hypothesis, and 
the Box-Jenkins approach to time-series econometrics. God simply plays dice. From the 
perspective of modern statistical theory, this is of course also a pattern, one whose signature 
can also be detected with quantitative techniques. And as Beck [1] among others has 
pointed out, any stationary time series will be subdividable into periods of above and below 
average behavior, without this being due to any underlying ‘mechanism’ other than the 
persistence of random effects. Thus the Heracleitan vision may admit the differentiation of 
the historical record into eras or epochs, each due to unique historical factors, but not long 
waves in the sense they have been used in that literature: repetitions of a basic underlying 
mechanism allowing a certain predictability. The long-wave debate strikes me as still 
largely stuck within the conceptual confines of the second pattern (after conditioning 
perhaps on steady-state growth, an element of the first pattern). I will argue in the following 
that there may be an alternative situated somewhere in between the second and third 
possibilities that, while not being cyclical, has a distinctive pattern, and while showing 
elements of persistence, is not very predictable. 
 Why is pattern recognition important? Take one of the first documented instances of 
a ‘scientific’ identification of a pattern with major policy implications: the biblical Joseph’s 
dream of seven years of plenty and seven years of famine. At first glance this is classical 
cyclical model that allows very accurate forecasting, probably the first aim of any pattern 
recognition enterprise. In fact, Hurst [2] convincingly showed that the Nile does not admit 
any such simple cyclical pattern. Instead, it displays remarkable persistence, with years of 
exceptionally high or low flow following each other much more frequently than pure 
chance would lead us to expect. This observation does not provide us with a forecasting 
tool like a truly cyclical model would, but does have important implications for the safe 
design of dams (and for the prudent stockpiling of grain). Thus other properties of a pattern 
such as persistence may differentiate it from pure chance without admitting much 
forecasting. Patterns are also important clues for the construction of models and the 
identification of underlying mechanisms. Thus Kepler’s laws led to Newton’s celestial 
mechanics,1 the fit of the east coast of South America into the west coast of Africa (a 
coincidence many had derided as illusory) ultimately lead to the theory of plate tectonics, 
and the complex spectra of gases led to the quantum mechanical theory of the atom. But 
neither the canals of Mars nor the patterns of bumps on people’s heads led to the 
identification of alien civilizations or a phrenological theory of the human psyche. Thus 
purported patterns must be treated with care, and a methodologically sound case must be 
established that they really exist and are not figments of our order-loving fantasy. 
 To this end, this paper applies some of the ideas, models and methods used by 
myself and my collaborators in previous papers [3-7] that focused primarily on purely 
economic factors, to questions of long waves in war and international relations. For 
purposes of illustration and clarity of exposition I concentrate in the following empirical 
section on a dataset on seapower [8] and one on great power conflicts [9]. In the final 
theoretical section I attempt to integrate these results with existing models of 
technoeconomic evolution into an overarching theory of innovation and paradigm 
lifecycles. 
 
2 Long Waves in Warfare and Great Power Relations? 
 
While most long wave research has focused on economic variables, Kondratiev [10] 
already suggested that wars might be more likely to occur at the end of the upswing phases 
of his 50-60 year economic cycles, with causality running from economic competition for 
scarce resources and markets to the propensity for conflict. Goldstein [11] has made the 
relationship between armed conflict and economics the center of his research, with a greater 
emphasis on the autonomous dynamics of warfare than Kondratiev and a claim that the 
Levy data for great power conflict show 50 year cycles and correlates with his other 
indicators of long wave activity. Modelski and Thompson [8,12] are particularly associated 
with a long wave theory of hegemonic seapower cycles of approximately 110 years in the 
period of European domination of the world (oceanic) economy since 1495 (subsequently 
extended to Sung China and the Eurasian overland economy from ca. 1000 AD onwards in 
[13]). 
 Beck [1] has convincingly argued that the question of long cycles can only be 
answered within the context of the well-understood methods of spectral analysis.2 I address 
this question for the Modelski/Thompson (MT) seapower data by computing the Herfindahl 
index of seapower concentration from their original data in place of their ‘leading power’ 
and ‘systemic concentration’ indices.3 Figure 1 plots the spectral density of this time series 
on a double-log scale. The spectral densities of the MT leading power indices are quite 
similar. 
Two things are remarkable about this figure. First, there are no prominent individual 
frequencies standing out above the usual noisiness of spectral plots, in contrast to MT’s 
claim for the existence of 110 cycles.4 Second, the spectral density is fitted quite well by a 
power-law function with slope –1.8325 over almost three decades of frequency. 
y = 0.0013x-1.8325
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Figure 1 Spectral density of Herfindahl index of 
seapower concentration, on double-log scale, with 
fitted power law. 
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Figure 2 Spectral density of standardized 
residuals of Levy/Goldstein great war fatalities 
data, double-log scale. 
   
 Figure 2 plots the spectral density of the standardized residuals from fitting a 
negative binomial model to the Levy/Goldstein time series of fatalities in wars fought 
between great powers in the period 1495-1975.5 The estimated α of the negative binomial 
model is 10.7 and is significantly larger than zero at the 1% level on a likelihood ratio test, 
indicating that war fatalities are much more highly clustered than random. After 
conditioning on these facts, no distinct cyclical frequencies are apparent, in contrast to 
Goldstein’s [11] conjecture of a 50-year cycle. However, something like a power-law 
pattern again seems to emerge, at least in the range 8-100 years. At shorter and longer time 
scales the spectrum resembles white noise. Quite similar results hold for the time series of 
all wars involving great powers in this period. 
 While at first sight these results may seem disappointing from a traditional long-
wave perspective, they accord rather well with what is also known about many economic 
time series since [18]: the spectral density seems to diverge at low frequencies and follow a 
power law. This is in contrast to the standard view of stationary time series characterized by 
short memory, where ∞<∑+∞∞− || tc , with ct being the autocovariance of the series, implying 
a spectral density going to zero at low frequencies. Where this is not the case but the series 
is not integrated, long memory is present and correlations between distinct times persist 
longer than one would otherwise expect (recall the biblical case). Long memory can be 
characterized by a fractional differencing equation of the form tt
d LBxLLA ε)()1)(( =− , 
where L is the lag operator, A(.) and B(.) are polynomials representing short-memory 
processes, and -1<d<1 is the long memory parameter. We can test the hypothesis that d≠0 
by using Robinson’s semi-parametric lpr estimator [6, 19]. For the seapower Herfindahl 
index this yields a value of d of 0.89, for the original MT LP series 0.88, both significant at 
the 1% level. For the standardized residuals of the Goldstein/Levy great war fatalities 
dataset d is 0.34, again significant at the 1% level. 
 Richards [20] also claims to have found evidence for low-dimensional chaos in the 
original MT LP time series, after also dismissing claims for strict periodicity. She employs 
the Grassberger-Procacia correlation dimension to calculate a value around 3.5 using an 
embedding dimension of at least 7 (see her Fig. 3, p. 62). However, her diagram fails to 
show if any real convergence was obtained over a range of distances in the phase-space 
embedding, and, as she also points out, the number of observations (507) is probably 
insufficient to support this claim. She also fails to employ a Theiler window to exclude 
pairs of points within the linear autocorrelation time of each other, something that as 
become standard practice since her article was published (see e.g. [21, 22]). For this reason 
I have repeated her calculation using the c2 algorithm from the TISEAN package [22] using 
a Theiler window of 42 for the Herfindahl seapower time series. 
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Figure 3 Correlation dimension of the 
Herfindahl index for embedding dimensions 1-
9 as a function of neighborhood size. 
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Figure 4 Share of false nearest neighbors as a 
function of embedding dimension, for Theiler 
window size 0 (triangles) and 42 (squares).
 The theory of phase space embedding states that if a time series is produced by a 
low-dimensional chaotic system, then by creating vectors of dimension m (the embedding 
dimension) using time-delay components of the original series, the topology of the strange 
attractor of fractional dimension d will be reconstructed for sufficiently high m. Figure 3 
shows the procedure for estimating the correlation dimension. Starting at embedding 
dimension 5 there is in fact a small range of convergence, but at a value of the correlation 
dimension just above 2. That embedding dimension 5 is sufficient to recover the attractor is 
confirmed by Figure 4, which plots the percent of false nearest neighbors as a function of 
the embedding dimension for the Herfindahl index. This indeed falls off to almost zero at 
an embedding dimension of 5 for both  zero and 42 year Theiler windows. No such 
convergence is apparent for the MT LP series (not shown), in contrast to the result reported 
by Richards. The percent of false nearest neighbors also rises from embedding dimension 4 
to 5 in this case instead of falling off to zero. 
 A test has been proposed by Kennel and Isabelle [23] to differentiate between true 
low-dimensional chaos and colored or 1/fα noise, which can pass the above tests and also 
characterizes our datasets. It uses a one-step-ahead nonlinear predictor from the 
reconstructed trajectories in the phase-space embedding and compares the accuracy of 
forecasts with that of surrogate datasets generated randomly whose spectra resemble that of 
the original series. If low-dimensional chaos is present in the original series then the 
nonlinear forecaster should be statistically significantly more accurate in that case than for 
the surrogate data series. The results for the Herfindahl index are shown in Figure 5 (the 
test statistic is N(0,1) for the hypothesis that the original data does not allow higher 
nonlinear forecasting than surrogate data).6 Thus the ensemble of our time series tests 
indicate that the seapower Herfindahl index displays aspects of 1/fα noise, long memory, 
and low-dimensional chaos simultaneously, although the evidence for chaos, because of the 
shortness of the time series, is probably somewhat weak. 
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Figure 5 Nonlinear prediction statistic for the Herfindahl index of seapower for various embedding 
dimensions and time delays of the phase-space embedding. 
 
To demonstrate how variable the division of the modern period into epochs of 
hegemonic dominance can be, Figure 6 shows which power had the largest actual high-seas 
fleet when the Herfindahl concentration index exceeded a given threshold, indicating 
(according to a variable criterion) sufficient concentration of seapower to justify using the 
word hegemon.7 For intermediate ranges of the Herfindahl index (0.25-0.35) where the 
world seapower system fluctuates most of the time, the pattern begins to look more fractal 
than cleanly cyclical, with gaps indicating periods of transition or conflict between one 
dominant power and another. A threshold value between 0.25 and 0.3 probably best reflects 
the record of periods of dominance and conflict as commonly presented by naval historians. 
 
3 A Complex Systems Reformulation of the Long Wave Debate 
 
[1] and [24] present two extreme positions on the long wave question. The former (Beck) 
adheres to a hard-nosed statistical perspective that only highly regular and distinct 
individual periodicities revealed by spectral analysis count as true cycles. The latter 
(Goldstein) counters with two rather different and distinct concepts of a cycle. First, cycles 
in Goldstein’s view need not be synchronized with calendar time. Taken to its extreme, this 
position would admit almost any stochastic process as cyclical, even though the ‘periods’ 
might be completely random and unpredictable. Unless the advocates of such a view can 
adduce a deterministic mapping from calendar time to their cyclical time, Beck’s critique 
seems to me to be valid. Second, Goldstein maintains that if the underlying dynamic 
contains closed positive feedback loops, then we are also entitled to speak of cycles. This is 
both intriguing and prima facie wrong, since many such autocatalytic dynamical systems 
(starting with the simple Harrod-Domar model of economic growth) can produce very 
noncyclical behavior, such as steady-state exponential growth, chaos, or multistability. 
However, it does suggest that we need to extend our repertoire of dynamical systems and 
cyclical models to encompass more complex patterns. 
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Figure 6 Variation in the dating of hegemonic epochs according to the HI ≥ threshold criterion, using 
actual largest naval power in that year.  The height of the bars codes for the hegemon as follows: 
1=England 2=France 3=GB 4=NL 5=Portugal 6=Spain 7=USA. 
 
 The illustrative analysis of war fatalities and alleged seapower cycles presented in 
this paper, as well as previous work on innovation cycles and economic growth, offers an 
alternative perspective. First, we need to differentiate between ‘point-process-like’ 
phenomena like wars and technical innovations on the one hand, and system-level macro 
variables like power relations and aggregate output on the other, both in terms of their roles 
in an overarching theory and in terms of the relevant statistical methods of analysis. The 
former are highly unpredictable and variable, but it seems that they can be characterized as 
following an underlying exponential growth path in the modern era, and simultaneously as 
more highly clustered than a simple Poisson process. After controlling for this randomness 
and clustering, there does not seem to be any evidence for cycles in either realm. This is not 
to say that they are completely autonomous random variables simply following a complex 
stochastic process and unaffected by the rest of society. However, there do seem to be many 
reasons to favor the view that they occupy a privileged position as driving rather than 
driven variables, except in some long-term sense that they respond probabilitistically to 
changes in the configuration of macro variables and institutional frameworks. 
 The analysis of macro variables such as the seapower indices and aggregate 
economic output also fails to detect distinct periodicities. This should not be regarded as a 
purely negative result, however, since a pattern does seem to emerge: one of power-law 
spectra. While in the economic realm this has been known since at least [18], it can be 
regarded either as a simple statistical nuisance to be eliminated by appropriate differencing 
of the time series, or as a source of insight into underlying mechanisms of a quite different 
kind than simple cycles. In the last few years complex systems theory has come to 
recognize such power law relationships as possible signatures of widespread universal 
mechanisms in nature and society [25,35]. Instead of reacting with disappointment that the 
classical cyclical view has not been confirmed, we should rather embrace this insight as a 
clue to the directions of fruitful future research. 
 These findings also shed some light on the shortcomings of previous research. If a 
variable is really characterized by a power law spectrum, then looking at a finite segment of 
data of length T will always produce the largest spectral peak at period T/2, the limit of our 
resolution. Thus it is not surprising that analysis of the 100-150 years of economic statistics 
available in the 20th century has always led people to identify cycles of length 50-60 years, 
and that analysis of political data over the 500 years of the modern period even longer 
cycles. The existence of these continuous, as opposed to discrete, spectra, can also seduce 
researchers into chopping the frequency domain into all too regular pieces associated with 
e.g. period doubling characteristic frequencies such as the generation (30 years), the 
Kondratiev (60 years), the hegemonic (120 years), the democratization (250 years) and so 
forth, as [26] have argued. But it is precisely the scale-free (at least over a certain range of 
time scales) character of power-law spectra that sets them apart from other dynamical 
systems. Thus such classifications may be no more than convenient discretizations of the 
continuous hierarchy of time scales, unless very precise evidence is produced to the 
contrary.8 If we take them too literally we run the risk of falling victim to Whitehead’s 
fallacy of misplaced concreteness. 
 The relationship between the ‘event’ level (innovations, wars) and the macro level 
deserves closer analysis, and is also subject to a number of methodological caveats. [27] 
finds clustering of innovations corresponding (with a lag) to his macro long-wave dating. 
[28] already argued that the causality ran from the macro level to innovations (depressions 
triggering the adoption of innovations). [11] finds a somewhat similar relationship between 
great power wars and subsequent inflation. [1], using a bispectral method, even finds 
evidence for this correlation even while rejecting long waves themselves. Thus cross-
correlations and causalities may very well be present between two variables, but this need 
not be evidence of long waves in either. [3] actually demonstrate in a model in which the 
causalities are clear (in this case running exclusively from innovations to macro behavior) 
that a long wave dating resulting from the macro variables does produce a strong 
correlation with fluctuations in innovation activity, and in such a way that both a 
‘productivity paradox’ and a ‘depression trigger’ hypothesis seem substantiated. But in fact 
the macro variables simply amplify the stochastic variability of the innovation process with 
a delay – the innovation process itself displays no long waves whatsoever. And the 
implications of the correlation can easily be misinterpreted in either direction. The same 
may apply to the interrelationship between wars, economic fluctuations and power 
relations: causalities are difficult to tease out, and misleading conclusions may result from 
the superficial reading of correlations and timings. 
 Nevertheless, a certain consensus about the basic elements of a canonical ‘long 
wave’ model seems to be emerging. First, there is an underlying layer of events that initiate 
autocatalytic growth (or decay) processes, such as technological innovations, wars, changes 
of political regime, new institutional arrangements, and whatever initiates the rise of 
nations. These events occur randomly in time (but with exponential trend for the arrival rate 
in the modern period), are highly clustered, and are characterized by highly skewed and 
possibility power law size distributions (for innovations [29], for war [16]). Second, these 
events induce life cycles of some entity (a technology, an infrastructure, an institutional 
arrangement, nations) in competition with other entities in a Darwinian-like process of 
growth and decline, or diffusion and obsolescence. This process of structural change also 
has major implications at the aggregate, macro level, and may induce feedbacks back to the 
micro and even ‘event’ level. Examples can be found for technologies in [30,31] for war 
and international relations in [32,33]. These life cycles need not be of constant length or 
exactly repetitive pattern. In fact in [3,4], both the speed of diffusion and the level of 
saturation have random characteristics. Nevertheless, the aggregation of this repetitive (but 
not periodic) pattern generates macro variables with distinctive power law properties. This 
seems to be a robust result even if we allow feedback from the macro to the innovation 
level and considerably greater micro diversity [34]. Whether we wish to classify this kind 
of system as displaying long waves is perhaps a matter of taste. In any event it transcends 
the Procrustean bed of the original long wave discourse and opens up a vaster richer 
domain of dynamical behaviors, some of which are probably more consistent with many 
long wave researchers’ original intuitions (such as Schumpeter) than the primordial cyclical 
model ever was. It is also more consonant with the empirical ‘stylized facts’ that have 
begun to emerge from a more sophisticated statistical methodology in the last few years. 
Whether it will allow any sort of forecasting remains to be seen. The indicators of low-
dimensional chaos for which I have found some rather tentative support might provide 
some ability to do short-term forecasting, although not in as straightforward a manner as 
the naïve cyclical model. However, I am very doubtful that we will ever be able to move 
very far from a firm knowledge of the pattern (in a statistical sense) to a firm ability to 
forecast.9 Thus we arrive at a view of history situated somewhere in between well-defined 
statistical laws governing the chance and necessity process of evolution, and the 
Heracleitan uniqueness of traditional historiographic narrative. 
 
 
Notes 
                                                 
* I would like to thank George Modelski and William Thompson for making their recently updated leading 
power seapower dataset available to me, as well as Jack Levy for providing me with his war casualty dataset 
and a number of relevant papers. I would also like to thank Bart Verspagen for implementing the Poisson 
regression analysis of the Levy/Goldstein data and the nvc analysis of the Modelski/Thompson data. 
1 However, Kepler was led to them by the pursuit of his specious but mathematically appealing theory of the 
‘harmony of the spheres’: that the orbits of the then known planets were determined by the spaces between the 
nested natural polyhedra. Only the recognition of irreducible discrepancies between the empirical data and 
this Platonic pattern recognition exercise forced Kepler to propose his conceptionally quite different laws, 
which in turn led to Newtonian mechanics. His search for celestial analogues for acoustic harmonies is also 
somewhat reminiscent of the nested oscillations of both Schumpeter’s three-cycle theory and recent world-
system models. 
2 I will return to the issue of whether alternative definitions of cycles make sense in the last section of this 
paper. 
3 MT define a ‘leading power’ (LP) index of seapower by first identifying the leading power over stretches of 
history between what they identify as critical hegemonic wars, and then calculating that power’s share in the 
                                                                                                                                                     
sum of the forces of all seapowers whose raw shares in total world seapower is greater than 10%. This has the 
peculiar effect of imposing their long-wave dating on the index right from the start, since a) the leading power 
is not always the power with the largest naval forces in that year (this is true of Spain and Portugal vs. 
England and the Netherlands, in the 16th and early 17th centuries, and of England vs. the Netherlands and 
France for extended periods in the 17th century, and of Great Britain vs. the USA between the First and 
Second World Wars) and b) their choice of decisive hegemonic wars can be criticized for arbitrariness (thus 
[14] pp. 157-8 points out that MT leave out the Thirty Years’ War (1619-48/59), the War of Austrian 
Succession (1739-1748), and the Seven Years’ War (1755-1763), which most analysts include in any 
discussion of great power hegemony both for their global extent and intensity of casualties, not to mention 
lesser conflicts such as the wars between Charles V and France (1521-1559) and the Dutch War of Louis XIV 
(1672-1678), which played significant roles in establishing the European hegemon). In part this is a result of 
MT’s exclusive emphasis on global oceanic seapower to the complete neglect of land and regional naval 
forces (thus promoting Portugal to hegemonic status in the 16th century, although most analysts do not even 
consider it a great power at any time in the entire period, and excluding the Ottoman Empire). And it may also 
reflect an unconscious bias on MT’s part in favor of their 110 year long-wave (pre)conception. 
 MT’s other, ‘systemic concentration’ (SC) index is based on a formula proposed by [15]): 
∑ −−= ),/11/()/1( 2 NNsSC i  
where si is the share of power i in the total population of N powers. There are a number of inconsistencies in 
the way this index is calculated in Appendix B of [8]). First, the shares do not always sum to one (sometimes 
deviating by as much as 10%). Second, the number of great powers N entering the formula does not always 
correspond to the number of countries with nonzero shares (e.g., when a great power drops out of the 
population it sometimes, but not always, continues to be counted in the value of N). This is especially 
problematic since the Ray and Singer formula will undergo nontrivial jumps as N changes even if the sum Σsi2 
(which is in fact the usual Herfindahl index of concentration widely used in industrial economics) is otherwise 
practically unchanged. Finally, a number of values of MT’s SC index seem to be simply miscalculated for 
reasons that are not apparent. A detailed analysis of the problems of the MT indices can be obtained from the 
author as an Excel spreadsheet. 
 To correct for these problems I have recalculated a systemic concentration index by 
1) renormalizing the shares taken from MT’s Tables 5.6-5.9 by dividing them by the sum of shares in that 
year, thereby forcing them to sum to one. This is only a quick and dirty solution. A better one would be to 
recalculate the shares from MT’s raw data, but I have not found the time to do so until now; 
2) using the straight Herfindahl index Σsi2 instead of the Ray and Singer index. This is not sensitive to the 
proper specification of N and the inclusion or exclusion of marginal powers (and thus would also allow 
seapowers under MT’s 10% threshold to be included in the calculation without significantly changing the 
result, something I have also not yet undertaken in the present analysis). 
In the following I will rely primarily on this Herfindahl SC index, since it is not affected by ambiguities in the 
identification of the leading power or the number of powers, the two problems impairing the usefulness of 
MT’s LP and SC indices. For purposes of comparison I have also calculated a consistent SC index based on 
the Ray and Singer formula (which is much more variable than the one in MT’s Appendix B) and an 
alternative LP index, MaxS, reflecting the share of the naval power whose forces were actually largest in any 
given year. This analysis of the problems and inconsistencies of MT’s LP and SC indices is not meant to 
detract from their immense contribution to putting the discussion of hegemonic cycles on a firm empirical and 
theoretical foundation. It is an unavoidable correlate of quantitative analysis that the devil is always in the 
details. 
4 Plotting on a logarithmic scale gives a better indication of the relative significance of individual peaks in the 
spectrum than on a linear scale. See [1], Appendix, for a discussion of how to calculate the significance levels 
of spectral densities. 
5 This data is taken from [11] Appendix B, variable GPWAR of War Indicators table, which in turn is based 
on [9]. Goldstein distributes the fatalities evenly over the years of a war, except for the first and last year, 
which are apportioned half as many. In contrast to [1], I do not perform a spectral analysis directly on this 
data, since they obviously have characteristics rather different from usual random variables, in particular the 
large number of years with zero values. Instead I regard them as count data in the tradition of war analysis in 
[9,16,17]. The null hypothesis is that of a Poisson process with log-linear time trend. The alternative 
hypothesis is that of a negative binomial model representing a more clustering process than pure Poisson with 
a parameter α reflecting the degree of random clustering. I also introduce a dummy variable x1815 (=0 before 
1815, 1 afterwards) to reflect the often remarked structural change in the data after 1815: great power wars 
become less frequent but more severe. The method of Poisson regression is then applied to each model (see 
[5] for details) for the Poisson arrival rate λ: 
txbtbxaat 181521181521)(ln +++=λ  
                                                                                                                                                     
The estimated point variances are λ(t) for the Poisson model and λ(t)(1+αλ(t)) for the negative binomial one. 
The standardized residuals are then ))(1)((/))()(( ttttx αλλλ +− , where x(t) are the annual observations. 
This controls for the exponential trend and the heteroskedasticity of the data according to the relevant model. 
Spectral analysis is then applied to these residuals. The net result is not remarkably different than that 
obtained by [1], however. 
6 The 507 observations of the original series are extended by three repetitions of the first value and two of the 
last to obtain the power of two observations (512) needed by the nvc algorithm. Analysis of 256 
‘unadulterated’ observations from the beginning, middle and end of the original series showed similar results, 
with the beginning and middle being perhaps somewhat less significant and the end distinctly more so. 
7 Recall that the MT LP index reports the share of the power MT identify as the leading power in that time 
interval even if that power does not currently possess the largest fleet by MT’s own measures. MT define 
hegemony to apply when the LP index exceeds 50%, but of course their results could also be examined as a 
function of a variable threshold. 
8 [26] also propose a power law for their nested cascade of world system processes. Quite apart from the 
plausibility of their identification of specific periodic processes in the very uncertain empirical record 
encompassing 8000 years of human history (and even in the case of the seapower dataset it should now be 
clear that the claim for periodicity is highly dubious), it is evident that regressing the number of repetitions np 
of a periodic process in a time interval of length T against the period p of the process (np = T/p) will always 
yield a power-law exponent of  -1. Thus it is not surprising that they obtain an exponent of −0.9991: they are 
simply estimating a mathematical/conceptual identity and not a relationship between independent  
observations. 
9 In this the social system may be analogous to the study of earthquakes, where the well-established 
Gutenberg-Richter (power) law and some knowledge about the temporal clustering properties of earthquakes 
still does not provide us with any lever for forecasting. 
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